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Address
Informing the Public about the U.S. Supreme Court's
Work
Ruth Bader Ginsburg*
My remarks this afternoon concern informing the public about the
work the Supreme Court does. I will speak of efforts simply to
describe the Court's actions (both in-house efforts and press reports),
and also of feedback on the Court's dispositions-comment on, or
criticism of, the Court's work from people who keep us alert to our
fallibility, reviewers who stimulate us to try harder, especially to write
more comprehensibly.
I.
The Court speaks primarily through its opinions. It holds no press
conferences and its members appear on no talk shows. But we try, in
several ways, to advance public understanding of the Court's role and
judgments.
On mornings when decisions are announced, opinion authors read
aloud in the Courtroom short bench statements, running three to ten
minutes in length, summarizing what the Court held and the principal
reasons for the decision. Just after I read a bench statement, I supply
the pages to our Public Information Office for immediate distribution
to the press. I try to write the statements in plain English, copyable by
reporters racing against a clock.
Every Court opinion is prefaced by a syllabus, which states the
essential facts and outlines the Court's disposition in more detail than
the bench announcement. A legend printed on the first page of every
decision warns that "[tihe syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared [simply] for the convenience of the
reader," and may not be cited as authoritative.' The syllabus is drafted
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. This address, presented at
Loyola University Chicago School of Law on August 22, 1997, is a revised and updated
version of a lecture originally published in 83 GEO. L.J. 2119 (1995). The address is
published substantially as delivered at Loyola. To aid the reader, footnotes have been
added.
1. The legend refers to United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., in which the
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by the Reporter of Decisions, but the justice who wrote the opinion
may edit it closely and sometimes rewrite passages, as I more than
occasionally do, mindful that busy lawyers and judges may not read
more.
Since 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court has had a full-time Public
Information Officer, today aided by a staff of four. The prime mission
of the Public Information Office is to furnish reporters with the various
documents they need to write their stories. The current Public
Information Officer, Toni House, was for many years a reporter, so
she understands press pressures. She has differentiated the work of
the Court's Public Information Office from that of other government
public relations offices by emphasizing: "Here, we do not do spin."'
Perhaps the major way we tell others about our work is through the
talks we give to school and other groups who visit the Court, lectures
out-of-town at colleges and universities (like this one), participation in
bar and civic association programs, and also exchanges with
colleagues abroad. We all took part as actors in a film completed last
fall, a 22-minute presentation designed to serve as an introduction to
the Court. That film, with settings in our Courtroom and conference
room, is now shown throughout the day in the Court's small ground-
floor theatre.
The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate, last year, displayed
what may have been a misapprehension of judges' extracurricular
endeavors. The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts sent a survey to federal
court of appeals and trial court judges in January 1996 inquiring,
among other things, about extracurricular activities. Questions
included:
(a) Are you involved in ... teaching, lecturing, writing law
review articles ... ?
(b) If so, how much time do you spend on these activities,
including preparation and travel?
(c) [W]hat is the compensation you receive for such activities?3
Many judges found the survey disquieting. Some found it a good
Court observed that "the headnote is not the work of the court, nor does it state its
decision. . . . It is simply the work of the reporter, gives his understanding of the
decision, and is prepared for the convenience of the profession in the examination .of the
reports." United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906).
2. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 48
(1994) (quoting Toni House).
3. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., REPORT ON THE JAN. 1996 JUDICIAL SURVEY, pt. 2, app. A, at 2
(1996) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
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chance to educate. Ralph K. Winter, now Chief Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and long-tenured Yale Law
School teacher, viewed the survey as "an opportunity to dispel
myths."4
An overwhelming majority of the court of appeals judges who
responded to the survey (and a large majority did respond) reported:
Indeed yes, they are involved in extracurricular educational and
professional activities-notably teaching, lecturing, and occasionally
writing law review articles, even books.5 (Our Chief Justice has
written two books so far,6 and is working on a third, about civil
liberties in war time. In that, he is following tradition. Chief Justice
John Marshall, for example, wrote-and several times revised-a
five-volume biography of George Washington. 7) Most of our
extracurricular endeavors entail no monetary compensation. The
Executive Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference, in its own
response to the Senate Subcommittee's survey, explained that
"[f]ederal judges.., have a long and distinguished history of service
to the legal profession through their writing, speaking, and teaching."8
The Committee endeavored to gain a clearer understanding by
legislators and the public that interaction between law schools, bar and
civic associations and judges should be strongly encouraged, not
viewed with suspicion.
If the U.S. Supreme Court is more accommodating to the press than
it was in days before syllabi at the start of the Court's opinions, and a
Public Information Office, the Supreme Court press corps still lacks
the inside information that is grist for reporters' mills on other beats.
Because confidentiality is vital to the way the Judiciary works, that
lack of information is likely to persist.
II.
Journalists who cover the U.S. Supreme Court must be selective.
They must select nowadays from upwards of 7000 petitions for
4. Deborah Pines & Bill Alden, District, Circuit Judges Use Senate Survey to Boast,
Gripe, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at 1.
5. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 49.
6. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS (1992) [hereinafter GRAND INQUESTS];
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is (1987) [hereinafter
THE SUPREME COURT].
7. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OFA NATION 328-32 (1996).
8. EXECUTIVE COMM. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RESPONSE OF
THE EXECUTIVE COMM. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JUDICIAL
SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE
COURTS, UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Feb. 1996, at 19.
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review, and 80 to 100 oral arguments and decisions, the cases that
warrant public attention. They do well, but they have missed some big
ones. One notable example, on April 25, 1938, Justice Brandeis
announced the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins. 9 "The question," Brandeis stated, "is whether the
oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be
disapproved."' Erie, as every U.S. federal procedure student learns,
overruled a precedent that held sway for nearly a century. Erie decreed
that federal courts were to elaborate only on federal law; general
common law, Erie firmly recognized-under the Rules of Decision
Act, read in light of the Tenth Amendment-fell within each State's
domain." Yet not even the New York Times found that news-the
news of Swift's demise-immediately fit to print.
Justice Stone, one week after Erie's release, wrote privately to
Arthur Krock of the New York Times calling Erie "the most important
opinion since I have been on the court."' 12 The message took hold, and
the next day, Krock devoted his column to the "Momentous Decision,"
Krock's comment opened:
If the Supreme Court, like so many other arms of the
government, had a publicity agent, eight days would not have
passed before the importance of its decision in the Tompkins
case became known. Though Justice Brandeis delivered this
transcendentally significant opinion a week ago yesterday, it has
generally eluded public notice. 13
We still have no publicity agent but, as I just noted, we do have a
Public Information Office to aid the press and, despite lack of access to
inside information, the press has grown in capacity to relate what the
Court does. No justice need today send letters of the kind Justice
Stone dispatched to the New York Times on Erie. And I doubt any of
my colleagues would say, as Justice Miller did late in the nineteenth
century: The members of the press "have combined to bring the
Courts and the administration of justice under their control, by their
appeals to popular prejudice, accompanied by the usual amount of
9. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
10. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
11. See id. at 79-80.
12. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE L.Aw 476-77 (1956)
(quoting letter from Harlan Fiske Stone, United States Supreme Court Justice, to Arthur
Krock, Columnist, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1938)).
13. Arthur Krock, A Momentous Decision of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1938, at 22, quoted in Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011,
1029 (1978).
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lying." '14
There are occasional slips, of course. Still too often in my view, the
press overstates the significance of something the Court or a justice
does, or of an order denying review. An example from the current
Term-when we declined to review a decision of the Ninth Circuit
regarding California's Proposition 209,15 one front page article
opened: "[T]he United States Supreme Court upheld California's
sweeping ban on affirmative action policies."' 6 In truth, we did not
uphold or affirm anything in the Proposition 209 case. We simply
denied review.
My colleague Justice Stevens, in published statements, time and
again reminds that a denial of a request for review (a petition for
certiorari) leaves the lower court decision unreviewed, neither
approved nor disapproved.'" Reasons why a petition fails to attract the
four votes needed to grant review vary from the technical to the
prudential: review may be sought too late; the judgment of the lower
court may not be final; a case may raise an important question but the
record may be cloudy; the particular controversy-although not the
large issue it raised-may have become moot; the matter may benefit
from further opinions, further percolation in the lower courts, for, in
Justice Frankfurter's words, "[wlise adjudication has its own time for
ripening. '"18
14. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at
279 (1939) (quoting letter from Samuel Freeman Miller, United States Supreme Court
Justice (Jun. 23, 1875)).
15. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997), denying cert. to
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.).
1 6. Sam Howe Verhovek, Referendum in Houston Shows Complexity of Preferences
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al.
17. See Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184, 1184 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (commenting that "on occasion it is appropriate to restate the
settled proposition that this Court's denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on
the merits"); see also Brown v. Texas, 118 S. Ct. 355, 356 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari) (stating "the Court's action in denying certiorari does
not constitute either a decision on the merits of the questions presented or an appraisal
of their importance.") (citations omitted); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047
(1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (stating "[a]s I have pointed out
on past occasions, the Court's denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the
merits."), reh'g denied, 117 S. Ct. 1465 (1997).
18. Singleton v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 940, 943 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (quoting Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-19 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of certiorari)); see id. at 945 (providing possible
reasons for the denial of certiorari as (1) "absence of any conflict among the Circuits
[may be] a sufficient reason for denying certiorari;" (2) "in allocating the Court's scarce
resources, [it may be] entirely appropriate to disfavor complicated cases which turn
largely on unique facts;" and (3) "[a] series of discussions by the courts of appeals may
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The press tells the public not only about what the Supreme Court
decides and what we decline to decide. Reporters also write about oral
arguments before the Court. The American Bar Association's Division
for Public Education, in cooperation with the Association for American
Law Schools and the Newspaper Association of America Foundation,
is making a vital contribution in that regard. In advance of each of the
Term's seven two-week sitting periods, the Division for Public
Education publishes a newsletter called Preview, a journal containing a
synopsis of each case calendared for argument. Law teachers write the
previews - each running four or so double-columned pages in
length-in commendably plain English. These synopses can aid the
press to comprehend the threshold issues on which decisions
sometimes turn-standing or mootness, for example. A grasp on
these issues may yield reports more enlightening than the report of a
case from last Term announcing that the Supreme Court ordered the
eight-year-old Arizonans for English as an Official Language suit
dismissed for "legal technicalities."' 9
Now and then, the press ventures a tentative forecast based on oral
argument. My first Term on the Court, for example, in mid-April
1994, we heard argument in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,20 a case
concerning court control of punitive damages awarded by juries. Five
days later, a lawyers' journal, the Legal Times, described the argument
for Honda as disappointing-a performance both "faltering" and
"unfocused. ' 21  The same report described as "dazzling" the
performance of counsel for the punitive damage awardee-the
personal injury plaintiff. That argument, in the reporter's view,
"captivat[ed]" the Court.22 In the fullness of time-in the June opinion
flurry-the Court announced its judgment: 7-2 for Honda, the party
whose lawyer, in the opinion of the Legal Times reporter, had faltered
and "never ... recovered." I wrote a dissent in the Honda case,
well provide more meaningful guidance to the bar than an isolated or premature opinion
of this Court").
i 9. Joan Beck, Congress Should Pass "English-only" Legislation, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
6, 1997, § 1, at 25.
20. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
2 1. Tribe Drives Home Points in Honda Case, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 10. A
later issue of the Legal Times published an experienced appellate advocate's letter to the
editor disagreeing with the reporter's appraisal of the argument for Honda. The letter
stated: "In my view, [Honda's attorney] made a clear, well-reasoned, and effective
argument on behalf of Honda in challenging circumstances." Robert A. Long, Jr., Frey
Excelled at the Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, May 9, 1994, at 42.
22. Tribe Drives Home Points in Honda Case, supra note 21, at 10.
23. Id.
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joined only by the Chief Justice.24 As I recall, upon release of the
decision, there was scant comment on the captivating counsel's lack of
success. 25 But I am sympathetic, for the press operates with necessary
haste. I appreciate, too, what New York Times Supreme Court
reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote on this topic: The press corps "is
often groping along in the dark, trying to make sense out of the
shadows on the cave wall.,
26
What should be the objective of press accounts of oral arguments?
Not to predict winners, I think. One television reporter, Rita Braver,
offered this description-of what she tried to convey to her audience: "I
hope with an argument story you and your spouse will get into a
discussion of which side is right." 27 A worthy aim, don't you agree.
The U.S. Supreme Court operates on a Term system-every case
heard from the first Monday in October through the last sitting day in
April or May must be decided before we leave town in July. It is not
uncommon, on days in June, for the Court to release in one fell swoop
six or even more opinions, consuming over 100 pages in the small
print of U.S. Law Week. June opinions, understandably, are
reporters' pet peeves. They have asked that we stagger June opinions
daily across the month or, at least, the final weeks. We have
accommodated them only in part by adding three or four extra sitting
mornings in June's last two weeks.
I have it on reliable authority that reporters would like us to add to
our opinions a "practical effects" section in which we spell out the real
world impact of the opinion.28 But they know that is wishful thinking,
for case law generally does not work that way. In our common law
system of adjudication, matters seldom can be fully settled "on the
basis of one or two cases;" they generally "require a closer working
OUt, '29 often involving responses by, or a continuing dialogue with,
other branches of the federal government, the States, or the private
sector.
24. See 512 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25. But see Tony Mauro, Justice Ginsburg Presses Her Case, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 27,
1995, at 10 (recognizing, "in retrospect," that argument of counsel for Honda "may have
been . . . strategically wise").
26. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1559 (1996).
27. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 76 (quoting CBS news correspondent Rita Braver).
28. See Letter from Paul M. Barrett of the Wall Street Journal to author (Oct. 25,
1994) (on file with author).
29. Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 339
(1940) (Conference on the Status of the Role of Judicial Precedent).
1998]
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III.
I turn now from reporting Court decisions to feedback on Court
dispositions. As James Oakes, a former Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, accurately observed,
life tenure-which all federal judges in the United States enjoy-does
not mean insulation from inspection. "[Hiardly an institution," Judge
Oakes said, "operates with so many built-in checks and balances
capable of instant criticism. ' 3 Judge Oakes mentioned among the
critics: one's own colleagues and other judges, law professors, law
reviews, and, "to an ever greater and more professional extent, the
press."'" To that list, I would add the U.S. Congress, for the
legislature is a prime audience for and responder to judicial opinions.
Most of the work currently done by U.S. federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, involves not grand constitutional principle, but the
interpretation and application of statutes passed by Congress, laws that
are sometimes ambiguous or obscure. When Congress has been
Delphic or dense, or simply imprecise, courts often invite, and are glad
to receive, legislative correction or clarification.32
Regarding the Judiciary itself, I will tell you of the responses I get
to an opinion in circulation. My colleagues closely guard the label,
"Opinion of the Court." They do so in "Dear Ruth" letters responsive
to a circulating opinion. Such letters not uncommonly read: "Please
consider adding, deleting, dropping, revising to say . . . ;" or, more
hopefully, "I will have no problem joining if you will take out, put in,
30. James L. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 948-49 (1979).
31. Id. at 949.
32. Both in his book and in several articles, Robert Katzmann describes current
efforts to aid Congress to address court interpretations of unclear legislation, and to
train the legislative mind on court of appeals decisions, as well as Supreme Court
opinions, construing ambiguous statutes. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS
& CONGRESS (1997) (examining the relationship between the courts and Congress and
offering suggestions for improving communication between the two); Robert A.
Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication
Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEO. L.J. 2189, 2190-91 (1997)
(reporting on the progress of a project concerned with improving communication
between the courts and Congress); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf
Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J.
653, 654-55 (1992) (discussing an inquiry into the types of mechanisms that might
improve interaction concerning statutory revision between the courts and Congress).
For commentary on the Katzmann & Herseth article, see M. Douglass Bellis, A View
from the House of Representatives, 85 GEO. L.J. 2209 (1997); Frank Burk, Statutory
Housekeeping: A Senate Perspective, 85 GEO. L.J. 2217 (1997); Mark J. Langer,
Implementing the Project: A Court Administrator's Role, 85 GEO. L.J. 2219 (1997);
James L. Buckley, The Perspective of a Judge and Former Legislator, 85 GEO. L.J. 2223
(1997).
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alter or adjust as follows."33 I am comforted, at such times, by a
remark our Chief has traced to Chief Justice Hughes: Hughes said that
during the many years he served on the Court "he tried to write his
opinions clearly and logically, but if [another justice whose vote was
necessary to make a majority] insisted on putting in [particular
language] .... in it went, and let the law reviews figure out what it
meant.,
34
There was a long time in the U.S. Supreme Court's history, indeed
until Chief Justice Melville Fuller's 1888-1910 tenure, during which
justices did not routinely circulate their draft opinions among their
colleagues prior to delivery. The consultation process was less formal;
the opinion author in those days had a freer hand to compose and
publish an opinion untouched by all his colleagues' minds.35 I would
not vote for a return to that old way. Most of the time, my colleagues'
comments help me to improve an opinion. And there is nothing better
than a good dissent to force one to sharpen her presentation for the
Court.3 6
Opinions in controversial U.S. Supreme Court cases often go
through multiple drafts, first to gain at least five votes, then to account
for dissenting or separately concurring opinions. No opinion I have
ever written for the Court has survived totally untouched by other
minds. On a collegial court, in short, one's own colleagues are both
dress rehearsal and opening night critics. Supreme Court justices
benefit, too, when other judges in the system, both federal and state
judges, endeavor to parse our precedents, revealing gaps we can fill,
or infirmities we can remedy the next time around.
For enlightenment on decisions past, present, and future, do judges
read legal commentaries and law reviews? Yes, most of us do.
33. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for American Law Institute Annual Dinner,
May 19, 1994, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 881, 886-87 (1994).
34. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 302.
35. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815, at
183-95 (1988) (III-IV OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES) (describing Marshall Court practice of delivering an "Opinion of
the Court" produced by a single justice - usually Marshall himself -without prior
review by other Court members); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION
1864-1868, PART ONE 69-70 (1971) (VI OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) (continuing this practice, with minor
modifications by the Chase Court); CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 320-31 (1939) (initiating the practice of circulating
opinions during Fuller Court).
36. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430
(1986); Antonin Scalia, Nineteenth Annual Lecture: The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 33,41.
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Benjamin Cardozo said on this matter: "Any morning's mail may
bring a law review . . . to disturb our self conceit and show with
pitiless and relentless certainty how we have wandered from the path.
The reviewer seems to say [as does a character in Shakeseare's
Othello]: 'It is a judgment maim'd and most imperfect.' 3  New
York's current Chief Judge, Judith Kaye, more recently and cheerfully
said: "Parties do not necessarily have in mind the sensible,
incremental development of [the law] . . . . Academic writers
therefore become genuine partners in the courts' search for wisdom.' 38
They aidus best, I might add, if they are honest and careful, and do
not, as Learned Hand said of the lazy judge, attempt to "win the[ir]
game by sweeping [opposing chess pieces] off the table. 39
If law journal citations in Supreme Court opinions are less
numerous in the 1980s and 1990s than they were in the 1970s,4° they
are hardly out of favor. My law clerks this year reported that in the
1995-1996 Term, law journal commentary was cited in at least
twenty-five of the Supreme Court's opinions, in contrast to October
Term 1937, the term the great case of Erie v. Tompkins was decided,
when citations to law review articles showed up in only six opinions.
We are, it is true, not of one mind on the value of academic
writings. Justice Souter noted in a 1996 opinion that "[t]he great
weight of scholarly commentary agree[d]" with his position.4 He
wrote in dissent.4 The Chief Justice, author of the majority opinion,
replied: The dissent "disregards our case law in favor of a theory
cobbled together from law review articles., 43 And in another case,
Justice Scalia charged Justice Stevens with advancing a "head-
snapping proposition," derived from "no less weighty authority than a
law-review article.""
37. Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 915-
16 (1953) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 1, sc. 3 (E.A.L. Honigmann ed.,
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 3d ed., 1977)) (repeating the words of the character Brabantio).
38. Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 319 (1989).
39. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1939).
40. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1986) (reporting
decline in number of citations to legal periodicals, from 963 in 1971-1973 Terms to 767
in 1981-1983 Terms).
41. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1150 n.8 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
42. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1129-30.
44. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 116 S. Ct. 1582, 1586
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
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Learned Hand said 70 years ago what I believe remains true of law
teacher and judge: "[E]ach is necessary to the other, each must
understand, respect and regard the other, or both will fail." 45
Before concluding with some words on the now traditional media, I
should at least note the vast potential of cyberspace for communicating
what the Court does, and for multiplying comment on the Court's
work. Electronic copies of our opinions are instantaneously available
to readers worldwide. By sending an E-mail message to Cornell
University's Legal Information Institute, for example, one gains
access to the syllabi of all Supreme Court opinions on the day of
release, along with instructions on accessing the full text of the day's
opinions. An online service for attorneys, Counsel Connect,
produces, as quickly as the opinions can be read, a discussion forum,
called "Supreme Court Watch," moderated by a practicing attorney, a
law professor, and a journalist; participants in this venture share views
on what we may or may not have wrought. The cognoscenti in the
academy subscribe to automatic mailing list services that enable them
to chat about our work product in various fields-administrative law,
criminal law, legal history, for example. Court opinions are also
discussed on dozens of the thousands of news groups on the Usenet
portion of the Internet.
The quantity of commentary in cyberspace is highly variable in
quality and cogency, a cacophonous debate some have called it. Like
most of my colleagues, I cannot even begin to tune in on the computer
media without a staff member's aid. But last year, the Court issued an
opinion with a citation-our first-to a site on the World Wide Web,
and this year, in a case involving indecency on the Internet, one friend
of the Court brief was presented on a CD-ROM. In time, we will find
our way into and around this new form of commentary, and
comprehend better how it can cast light on our work.
Returning, finally, to the more familiar mass media (newspapers
and magazines, radio and TV), Justice Frankfurter, it is said, urged the
press to cover the Supreme Court at least as well as it covered the
World Series baseball games.' In 1994, for once, his counsel was
heeded. (As you may recall, there was no World Series that year. 47)
Even if that never happens again, the press can be relied upon to
assure that the Court will not, as it should not, exist-to quote
45. Learned Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of
Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 480 (1926).
46. See LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 218 (1969).
47. See It's Official, It's Over, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at B14 (announcing the
cancellation of the 1994 World Series).
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Frankfurter again-as "a mystical entity ... set apart from the
community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other
public servants are exposed."'  There is, each Term, some "murky
decision-reporting," a veteran Supreme Court reporter
acknowledged.49 But, he explained, murky decision-reporting may
accurately capture a murky decision. o And so it may.
Critics of Court products sometimes exaggerate, to augment their
point. Legislators may condemn a judicial opinion as sacrilegious (an
opinion of mine, written while I served on the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, was So condemned),5 a dissenter may
call a Court opinion "ludicrous," 52 "inexplicable," ' or "folly, ' even
"terminal silliness."5 5 A law review writer may overlook what does
not fit into the writer's analysis. 56 An opinion I wrote in the 1995
Term was put down by one commentator as "slopp[y]" and "smug," 57
48. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Ironically, Justice Frankfurter penned these words in an opinion dissenting from the
reversal of contempt convictions decreed by trial courts against publishers of items
alleged to interfere with the ongoing "orderly administration of justice." Id. at 272.
49. John P. MacKenzie, The Supreme Court and the Press, in MASS MEDIA AND THE
SUPREME COURT: THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN YEARS 29, 30 (Kenneth S. Devol ed., 4th
ed. 1990) (reprinted from 67 MICH. L. REV. 303, 305 (1968)).
50. See id.
5 1. See 128 CONG. REC. 5890-95 (1982), reporting the House floor discussion of
H.R. Res. 413, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (enacted), a resolution expressing "deep
concern" over the panel decision in Murray v. Buchanan, No. 81-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Ginsburg, J.). That decision relied on Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), to hold that
a taxpayer had standing to challenge Congress's payments to its chaplains. The panel
decision was later vacated and the appeal dismissed after rehearing en banc. 720 F.2d
689 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding congressional payments, based on Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
52. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 767 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
judgment). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1185, 1194-96 (1992) (listing among invectives used in Supreme Court and
court of appeals opinions: "outrageous," "the quintessence of inequity," "a blow against
the People," "naked analytical bootstrapping," "reminiscent of Sherman's march
through Georgia," "Orwellian"); Philip A. Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1994, at 50, 52-53 (catalog of intemperate expressions appearing in opinions
issued during the October 1993 Term includes: "myopic," "baffl[ing]," "misleading,"
"facile," "steamrolling," "as blind to history as to precedent").
55. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Judges, too, are subject to this failing. But see Hand, supra note 39, at 362
("[Cardozo] never disguised the difficulties, . . . [H]e would often begin by stating the
other side better than its advocate had stated it himself.").
57. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Outrages and Curmudgeonly Complaints, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23
& 30, 1996, at 31.
U.S. Supreme Court's Work
but praised by another for its "powerful eloquence." It is indeed
hard, under the pressure of publication deadlines, to describe judicial
opinions with entire accuracy. And, to describe court actions
accurately, one of my colleagues has observed, is, in many cases, to
describe them boringly. 9
Jean Edward Smith's fine biography of John Marshall sets out a
memorandum Marshall wrote in 1798, when he was in Paris, as an
envoy of our government. The French foreign minister Talleyrand had
accused the U.S. government of manipulating the press.60 John
Marshall explained that the U.S. press could not be so controlled. His
words show the length and depth of our tradition:
Among those principles deemed sacred in America .... there is
not one ...more deeply impressed on the public mind, than
liberty of the press. That this liberty . . . has sometimes
degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented; but the
remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil
inseparable from the good to which it is allied, perhaps it is a
shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk, without
wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. However
desirable those measures may be, which might correct without
enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in
America.
And that, I believe, remains true to this very day.
To sum up what I have tried to convey, participants in the U.S.
system of justice prize fair comment on the work judges do. To assure
ample room for such comment, members of the judiciary must expect
and abide even comment of the unfair or uncomprehending kind.
Please indulge this last personal example.
An Associated Press ("AP") release misreported a talk I gave at
Louisiana State University last fall. The report said I called the U.S.
Constitution outdated.62 In fact, I praised the Constitution as it has
evolved over the course of U.S. history. The AP circulated a
correction, 63 but bad news, however incorrectly spun or distorted, is
not easily erased. One correspondent wrote: "Your extreme views are
outrageous. I am calling for your resignation." Another deplored my
58. The High Court Rejects Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at A32.
59. See Antonin Scalia, The Courts and the Press, American Enterprise Institute
Boyer Lecture 18 (Dec. 6, 1989) (on file with author).
60. See, SMITH, supra note 7, at 229.
61. Id. at 229-30.
62. See, e.g., Peter Shinkle, Justice Ginsburg: Constitution "Skimpy," THE BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Oct. 25, 1996, at IB-2B.
63. The AP correction circulated on November 4, 1996.
2871998]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
"alien, Anti-American ideology." Yet another wrote: "I am ashamed
that you were ever appointed to your position and especially ashamed
that you are a woman."
In April, the American Legion Magazine, a journal for armed
services veterans, reported in its Washington Watch column: "ACLU
views dominated [Ginsburg's] speech at Louisiana State University
'She's showing her true colors,' [a spokesman for] the Judicial
Selection Monitoring Project [commented." 64 Ominously, the Legion
Magazine added: "Congressional insiders predict the fallout [from
Ginsburg's talk] will be intense Senate scrutiny . . . of President
Clinton's future nominees to the federal bench. 65 After all the
advance billing, the issue perhaps will sell more than the usual number
of copies, but the piece itself will disappoint the sensationalists, for it
is entirely unprovocative fare.
While judges should have no immunity from critical commentary,
they should have fair-minded defenders as well-true friends of the
Court, people at the bar alert to the jealousy, mean spirit, oversight, or
lack of understanding that sometimes triggers unfair comment from the
political branches, the press, even the academy. True friends know
that the good judge, to borrow great constitutional law scholar Paul
Freund's words, is affected by the climate of the age, but will
withstand the weather of the day.'
64. Cliff Kincaid, Judge Not, Lest Ye .... AM. LEGION MAG., Apr. 1997, at 16.
65. Id.
66. See William H. Rehnquist & Paul A. Freund, A Colloquy, 124 F.R.D. 336, 338
(1988).
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